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ABSTRACT
The high degree of financial contagion across the Euro area during the sovereign debt crisis
highlighted the importance of systemic risk. In this paper we employ a Global VAR (GVAR) model
to analyse the systemic risk spillovers across the Euro area and to assess their role in the transmission
of monetary policy. The results indicate a strong interconnectedness among core countries and also
that peripheral economies have a disproportionate importance in spreading systemic risk. A systemic
risk shock results in economic slowdown domestically and causes negative spillovers to the rest
of the EMU economies. To examine how monetary policy impacts systemic risk, we incorporate
high-frequency monetary surprises into the model. We find evidence of the risk-taking channel
during normal times, whereas the relationship is reversed in the period of the ZLB with expansionary
shocks to result in a more stable financial system. Our findings indicate that the signalling channel is
the main driver of this effect and that the initiation of the QE program boosts the economic activity
but results in higher systemic risk. Finally, our results suggest that spillovers play an important role
in the transmission of the monetary policy and that there is evidence of significant heterogeneity
amongst countries’ responses with core countries to benefit the most from changes in monetary policy.
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1 Introduction
In the aftermath of the recent financial crisis the international transmission of financial stress has been a focal point
of research and policy analysis. In 2011, Christine Lagarde, the then Managing Director of the IMF, argued that
international financial exposures are “transmitting weakness and spreading fear” across markets and countries. The
collapse of systemically important financial institutions highlighted the importance of monitoring the risk spillovers
among countries. The cross-country financial linkages, and not the trade relationships, were the main stress transmission
mechanism in both the US subprime mortgage and the Eurozone debt crises (Grant, 2016). The European monetary
union (EMU) is a special case because on the one hand there is significant heterogeneity amongst countries and on the
other hand, there is high financial integration. The latter, despite all the direct and indirect benefits, could lead to more
costly crises, since economic activity is exposed to both domestic and regional (or global) financial shocks (Kose et al.,
2009 and Park & Mercado, 2014).
Due to the strong financial contagion in the euro banking system, a country level systemic risk event may become
aggravated and lead to a widespread negative effect on the union-wide financial stability (Allen et al., 2011).3 According
to the joint report of Financial Stability Board (FSB), International Monetary Fund (IMF) and Bank for International
Settlements (BIS), 2009, systemic risk is defined as the disruption of the flow of financial services, caused by an
institution or by part of the financial system, that could have an adverse effect on the real economy. The primary
objective of this paper is to examine the systemic risk spillovers across the Euro area. To capture systemic risk, we
adopt the ∆CoV aR measure4, which we then incorporate into a GVAR model that allows us to capture cross-country
spillovers. The ∆CoV aR methodology introduced by Adrian & Brunnermeier (2016)5 and we extend it to the country
level by employing an aggregate version for a market capitalization portfolio of the financial institutions for each
country. ∆CoV aR is one of the most widely used measures6 and its main advantage is that is based on micro-data, so
it is more informative than country-level measures that are based on government securities.7
The evidence suggests that Italy, Spain and Germany are the most systemically important countries in the monetary
union. However, shocks in some of the smaller countries (Ireland) can also have a sizeable impact at the union level.
We observe that core countries (namely Germany, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria and Finland) are highly
interconnected but their spillovers to the rest of the union members are low. On the other hand, the systemic risk shocks
in the peripheral countries (Italy, Spain, Greece, Portugal and Ireland) have a considerably larger effect on all the
3Brutti & Sauré (2015) argue that cross-border financial exposures were an important transmission channel and they argue that a
fragile foreign banking system could constitute a liability to the rest of the union members.
4For robustness purposes, we also use as an alternative indicator, the Composite Systemic Stress Index (CISS) provided by the
ECB database.
5Numerous studies focus on the estimation of systemic risk, however there is no commonly accepted measure in the literature.
Bisias et al. (2012) present an extended survey of the different measures grouped by their features. Each group captures a different
aspect of systemic risk, such as contagion, volatility, liquidity, macroeconomic environment and institution-specific measures (see
also Benoit et al., 2017).
6According to Google scholar, the ∆CoV aR methodology has been referenced by more than 2500 papers.
7For the estimation we include financial firms beyond the banking sector such as insurance companies, real estate firms and
financial services institutions. See also the recent work from Jin & De Simone (2020) expands the analysis of the euro systemic risk
beyond the banking sector by focusing on investment funds.
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EMU members. An important aspect of the definition of systemic risk is that it has potential adverse consequences
for the real economy (Adrian & Brunnermeier, 2016). Therefore, we examine the impact of systemic risk shocks
on economic activity. The results show that an unexpected increase in systemic risk leads to a slowdown in the real
economy domestically and causes negative spillovers to the rest of the EMU economies.
Finally, we examine the impact of monetary policy on systemic risk and we quantify what percentage of the response
can be attributed to risk spillovers. This one of the first papers to analyse separately the effect of conventional and
unconventional monetary policy shocks on financial stability8 and the findings present some novel policy implications.
For the identification approach, we employ the high-frequency shock series provided by Altavilla et al. (2019).9 Our
results indicate that the impact of monetary policy is not homogeneous across time and that, during the ZLB, the
relationship is being reversed; expansionary shocks result in a decrease in systemic risk. We then decompose and
analyse the effect of the different transmission channels of unconventional monetary policy: interest rate (target),
expectations (signalling/forward guidance) and QE. The findings indicate that the effect is heterogeneous across the
different channels. An accomodative signalling shock mitigates systemic risk, whereas policy rate and QE shocks
have the opposite effect. The findings also suggest that there is significant heterogeneity amongst countries with core
economies to benefit the most in terms of growth and financial stability. In addition, we provide evidence that the
spillover channel plays an important role on the transmission of monetary policy shocks. Lastly, our results indicate
that the relationship is bidirectional and that the ECB systematically reacts to systemic risk variation with expansionary
asset purchasing programs or by lowering the policy rate.
The paper is related to the literature of financial contagion in the euro area. Contagion is defined as the phenomenon of
a negative shock spreading rapidly across the financial system (Covi et al., 2019).10 There are different methodological
approaches in the literature to capture interconnectedness among firms or countries. Firstly, there are market data-based
(systemic risk) measures that capture the contagion by exploiting high frequency data on stock markets and Credit
Default Swaps (CDS). For instance, Billio et al. (2012) introduce various alternative econometric techniques to capture
connectedness such as principal component analysis (PCA) and Granger causality.11 More recently, Covi et al. (2019)
propose a Contagion Mapping (CoMap) methodology to analyse the degree of contagion following an exogenous
shock via counterparty credit and funding risks.12 Our approach differs from the other papers in the literature since we
estimate the systemic risk at the country level and we capture the contagion by analysing (exogenous) shocks to the
other member countries or regions.
8See also the recent work by Kabundi & De Simone (2020).
9In the benchmark model, we include the shadow rate by Wu & Xia (2016), which however is not widely acceptable as an
appropriate identification for monetary policy shocks. For that purpose use the high-frequency identification which constitutes a
more informative external instrument based on the response of government assets minutes after the announcements of the monetary
policy decisions.
10Contagion is defined as the increase in probability of a crisis domestically after the occurrence of a crisis in a foreign country
(Kaminsky & Reinhart, 2000 and Grant, 2016). In addition Forbes & Rigobon (2002) define contagion as is a significant increase in
cross-country linkages after a shock to one country.
11On the latter, there is the more recent work of Gómez-Puig & Sosvilla-Rivero (2014) focused on the EMU.
12Hüser (2015) provides a survey of the literature on network analysis, which can be used to assess the structure of the financial
system and the degree of interconnectedness among firms.
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From a methodological point of view, this paper belongs to the literature of GVAR modelling. A systemic event could
be caused endogenously from within the financial system or by an exogenous shock (see ECB report, 2009). In order to
examine these exogenous shocks and the international transmission of systemic risk shocks across the Euro area, we
employ a GVAR model that captures cross-country interdependencies with monetary policy being the common factor in
all examined countries. This is the first paper, to the best of our knowledge, that applies the GVAR framework to the
concept of systemic risk. The framework is a common approach to model the global economy and the financial linkages
amongst countries. For instance, Galesi & Sgherri (2009) provide evidence of strong comovements of financial markets
in 27 developed and emerging European economies. They find considerable cross-country linkage across Europe but
also significant exposure to US shocks. Similarly, Dovern & van Roye (2014) incorporate a Financial Stress Index (FSI)
in the GVAR model and they show that a shock in the US has a significant impact on the global markets. They also find
that co-movements of financial stress across countries increases during the period of a major crisis. Other papers also
analyse the financial spillovers by focusing on the transmission of liquidity and credit shocks (see Chudik & Fratzscher,
2011 and Eickmeier & Ng, 2015).
The GVAR literature has also been extended to the Euro area and it has been applied to various contexts such as fiscal
spillovers (Hebous & Zimmermann, 2013 and Ricci-Risquete & Ramajo-Hernández, 2015), trade (Bussière et al., 2009)
and house prices (Vansteenkiste & Hiebert, 2011). Another strand of the euro area GVAR literature focuses on the euro
area financial contagion although not for the concept of systemic risk. Bicu & Candelon (2013) apply the model based
on balance sheet data and sectoral CDS premia, to estimate the interconnectedness of the Eurozone banking sectors.
They find significant spillovers in between sovereign and banking risk measures, domestically but also across borders.13
Caporale & Girardi (2013) also find a strong link between euro area spreads and they show how the fiscal imbalances
lead to financial imbalances. All of the papers in the euro area GVAR literature argue that there are significant spillovers
in terms of economic activity and financial stability. To measure the degree of interconnectedness, we quantify the
impact of country-level systemic risk shocks to the union aggregate level.
The paper also contributes to the literature of monetary policy and systemic risk. Much of the existing literature supports
that low interest rates lead to excessive risk taking by financial institutions, the so-called risk-taking channel. Various
studies have covered different indicators of risk-taking activity and they find evidence for the transmission channel.
Neuenkirch & Nöckel (2018) and Dell’Ariccia et al. (2014) use data from lending surveys and argue that low interest
rates result to greater bank risk-taking in the EMU and the US respectively. Similar findings are presented by Delis &
Kouretas (2011) who use a large panel dataset related bank-lending channel and by Dell’Ariccia et al. (2017) that have
access on data on US banks’ internal ratings on loans to businesses. However, there is no extended literature in terms
of financial stability and the “systemic risk-taking channel”. Kabundi & De Simone (2020) identify this gap in the
literature and analyse the systemic risk responses following conventional and unconventional monetary policy shocks
identified using sign restrictions and they find evidence of the risk-taking channel. In addition, Faia & Karau (2019)
13Castrén et al. (2010) employ a GVAR model to assess the exposure of euro sector credit quality, measured by the expected
default frequency, to domestic and global macroeconomic shocks.
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include systemic risk measures in a VAR model and shadow rates as instruments of monetary policy. The present similar
results but also evidence of a price puzzle, which indicates that the identification of the monetary shock is problematic.
This is an issue that the high-frequency identification approach overcomes and also allows us to decompose the effect
of the different forms of policy and transmission channels. Kapinos (2020) highlights the importance of analysing
different transmission channels separately. He constructs a shadow nominal interest rate for the US and he finds that
expansionary monetary news shocks lead to a decrease in systemic risk, unlike monetary surprises. Our findings shed
light into the heterogeneous effect of monetary policy on systemic risk across different time periods and policy tools.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we present the ∆CoV aR methodology and the
construction of the systemic risk index. Section 3 describes the GVAR methodology. In Section 4, we discuss the
empirical findings of systemic risk shocks at the regional and euro area level. Section 5 focuses on the relationship
between systemic risk and monetary policy. We present the responses of systemic risk following a monetary policy
shock, but also the reaction of the central bank after an unexpected increase in systemic risk. Finally, Section 6
concludes.
2 Measuring Systemic Risk
A number of different systemic risk measures have been proposed in the literature, however there is not a commonly
accepted method. For our analysis, we apply one of the most popular systemic risk methodologies, ∆CoV aR, proposed
by Adrian & Brunnermeier (2016).14 The ∆CoV aR method is a widely-used measure of systemic risk and has been
applied in a variety of contexts. For instance, Bernal et al. (2014) apply the method for the different financial sub-sectors
and they find that the financial services and the banking sector are more systemically important than the insurance
firms in the Eurozone, whereas the latter is the systemically riskiest financial sector in the United States for the same
period of time.15 Similarly, Black et al. (2016) measure the systemic importance of the euro area banking institutions16
and their results suggest that since the 2011 sovereign debt crisis Italian and Spanish banks increased their marginal
contribution to the aggregate systemic risk.17 In a similar context, Reboredo & Ugolini (2015) apply the ∆CoV aR
methodology for the European sovereign debt markets and they find that the markets were coupled but after the offset
of the crisis, stressed economies, such as Portugal, present a significant increase in systemic risk. More recently, Faia
& Karau (2019) analyse the impact of US and Euro area monetary policy shocks on systemic risk by employing two
different versions of ∆CoV aR.
The method builds on the concept of Value-at-Risk (V aR), which is arguably one of the most widely used risk measures
for investors and policymakers. However it cannot be used for macroprudential purposes since it does not take into
14We also employ the CISS measure constructed by Holló et al. (2012) as an alternative measure of systemic risk. The main
findings are provided in the Appendix, Figure A3 and Table A5 and more detailed results are available upon request.
15Dungey et al. (2020) employ the ∆CoV aR methodology to examine the systemic importance of US industrial firms.
16They construct a distress premium based on the ∆CoV aR methodology.
17Varotto & Zhao (2018) examine the characteristics of banking institutions and their systemic importance. They support that
banks size is a primary driver of the most common systemic risk indicators. For the estimation of systemic risk they employ various
measures including ∆CoV aR and MES.
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consideration the links amongst firms. To capture this aspect of risk, Adrian & Brunnermeier (2016) develop the concept
of CoV aRs|iq , defined as the V aRq of the entire financial system when the firm i is under distress (returns equal to its
V aRq). The V aR, at q% confidence level,of an institution is defined by:
P (Ri ≤ V aRiq) = q, (1)
Similarly, CoV aR is defined as:
P (Rs ≤ CoV aRs|iq | Ri = V aRiq) = q, (2)
In equation (2), Ri and Rs denote the returns of institution i and of the financial system index respectively.18 The
systemic importance of an institution can be measured by focusing on its marginal contribution to the system’s risk. For
this purpose they take the difference between the CoV aRq with the one estimated in normal times (q = 0.5). ∆CoV aR
captures the risk spillovers from a firm across the financial system.
The mathematical definition for ∆CoV aR of firm i is:
∆CoV aRiq = CoV aR
s|Ri=V aRq
q − CoV aRs|R
i=V aR0.5
q . (3)
To estimate the dynamic ∆CoV aR we assume that the variation of asset returns is based on a set of state variables.
These variables are not considered to be factors of systemic risk, but they can capture time variation in the conditional
moments of the returns. For this purpose, we use the change in the three-month government bond yield, the yield curve,
the liquidity spread and returns of the market index.19
The estimation of the dynamic version is described in the steps below:
1. Dynamic VaR: V aRit(q) = âiq + ĉiqSt−1




q V aRit(q) +
ˆcs|iSt−1
3. Systemic risk: ∆CoV aRs|it (q) = CoV aR
s|i
t (q)− CoV aR
s|i
t (0.5)
In the first step we run the quantile regression of the returns of each individual firm with the country’s state variables
(St−1) to calculate the estimates âiq and ĉiq. By replacing the values back to the first equation, we obtain the dynamic
representation of the V aRi. Similarly in the second step, we compute the dynamic CoV aRi by running the regression
of the tail of the returns of the system with the V aRi of the examined firm and the state variables. Finally, to obtain the
systemic risk measure we take the difference between the CoV aR at the left tail (q%) of the distribution of the returns
and the one estimated at the median.
18The paper by Adrian & Brunnermeier (2016) estimates firms’ returns based on growth rates of market-valued total financial
assets. In our approach since not all the financial firms provide high frequency data, the estimation is based only on Price and Market
Capitalization data.
19In the Appendix, Tables A1 and A2, report the variables used in the model and in the estimation of the systemic risk index.
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For the cross-country analysis, we estimate the level of systemic risk at the country level by introducing an aggregate
version of the ∆CoV aR measure. Therefore, we compute the systemic risk for a market capitalization weighted
portfolio of financial firms including banks, financial services, real estate and insurance companies.20A similar approach
has been adopted by Rodríguez-Moreno & Peña (2013) for a portfolio of European and US stocks. The estimation of
systemic risk is at the national and not the European level to isolate potential cross-border externalities at this stage21.
For comparison purposes, we transform the ∆CoV aR into a systemic risk index with 2002m1 being the base year. The
following graph compares the logarithmic transformations of the euro area index and the CISS index from the ECB
database. Although the estimation methods are different22, we observe that they provide very similar results.
Figure 1: Systemic risk in the Euro Area
Notes: The figure reports the systemic risk estimation for the euro area based on two alternative measures. The black line
illustrates the ∆CoV aR country-level index and the red line the Composite Systemic Stress Index (CISS) provided by
Eurozone database. Both measures are expressed in log values. The examined period is 2001m1-2018m12.
Figure 2 illustrates the systemic risk index (in logarithms) for the eleven examined economies. We observe that the
Great Recession in 2008 and the sovereign debt crisis in 2012 both led to a considerable increase in systemic risk.
For individual countries, we observe two patterns. Core countries affected mostly by the 2008 global financial crisis.
Systemic risk was also high for all peripheral countries, which however were more exposed to the debt crisis and they
present their peak value at 2012.
20The data series are provided by Datastream and for the selection of the financial institutions we used the constituents of the
countries’ DS Financials Index. Fo robustness, we use weights based on a 6 month moving-average Market Capitalization and the
systemic risk indices is identical.
21See Buch et al. (2019) for the differences and the drivers of euro area systemic risk at the national and European level.
22The estimation of CISS is based on basic portfolio theory and five stress sub-indexes from the money, bond, equity and foreign
exchange markets. See Holló et al. (2012) for the detailed estimation of the index.
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Figure 2: Systemic risk in the Euro Area economies
Notes: The figure reports the log∆CoV aR index (base year: 2001) for the eleven examined euro area economies and the
euro area. The estimation is based on Price and Market Capitalization data, provided by Datastream, for a portfolio of
domestic financial institutions such as banks, insurance, real estate and financial services companies. The examined period is
2001m1-2018m12.
3 The GVAR framework
The GVAR methodology was introduced by Pesaran et al. (2004) and extended by Dees et al. (2007). The structure of
the model takes into consideration the international financial spillovers across the Euro area. This is the first paper,
to the best of our knowledge, that includes systemic risk measures to account for financial stability. We incorporate
eleven Eurozone countries and three macroeconomic variables for each country (Y ) ; logGDP23, Prices (logHICP)
and the systemic risk index. Each country (indexed by i = 1, ..., 11) is modelled as a small open economy with an
error-correction model that includes domestic and foreign variables. The mathematical representation of the VAR model
with exogenous variables (VARX (p, q)) is:











Ci,jXt−j + εi,t (4)
23We estimate the monthly GDP based on Chow-Lin interpolation using the quarterly GDP data provided by Eurostat and the
(monthly) industrial production index provided by FED of St.Louis.
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In equation (4) Ai,j is a matrix of coefficients related to the lags of the domestic variables and Bi,j and Ci,j are the
matrices of coefficients for foreign and global variables respectively. Country specific shocks (εi) are assumed to be
serially uncorrelated mean zero with a non-singular covariance matrix. To capture spillovers across the monetary union,
each national economy is also affected by a GDP-weighted matrix24 of foreign variables (Y ∗) as presented in Equation
(5). To ensure consistency, the foreign variables are treated as weekly exogenous, which implies that each country is
treated as a small economy with the domestic macroeconomic variables to have no long-run impact to foreign variables,
allowing however short-run feedback effects. Therefore, the international spillovers could have a short-term effect but







wi,j = 1 (5)
Monetary policy is the common factor (Xt) for all the countries and can affect the real economy directly and indirectly
through spillovers from the other euro area members. It is modelled as a function of the aggregate output, prices and
systemic risk (Ỹ ) to capture the ECB’s response to macroeconomic developments in the union.






Ỹt−j + ux,t (6)
In the first stage, we estimate each individual country’s VARX separately (see Equation 4). We select the lag order
based on the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and we impose a limit to the number of lags for the foreign variables
(qmax = 1) to secure model stability.25 The results are robust for different lag selection based on the Schwarz Bayesian
criterion (SBC).26 In the second step, all the country models are stacked in to create the GVAR model where all the
variables are endogenous. Specifically, Zt is a vector of all variables included (Yt, Y ′t )’:
27
Ai,0Zi,t = a0 +
p∑
j=1
Ai,jZt−j + εi,t (7)
We then use the weights (w) that capture bilateral exposure across countries and we define G = Aiwi to obtain:
G0Yi,t = a0 +
p∑
j=1
GjYt−j + εi,t (8)
24Using GDP weights is the norm for the GVAR literature. The estimation is based on the average quarterly GDP data provided by
Eurostat for the period 2001-2018 (see Appendix, Table A3). The results are similar if we use trade weights instead (see Appendix,
Table A5).
25We also set the lags of the feedback equation equal to one with alternative lag selections to provide similar results. Similar
assumptions have been made by Caporale & Girardi (2013). In the Appendix, Table A4 presents the optimal ordering based on the
Akaike information criterion (AIC).
26See Appendix Table A5, which presents the sensitivity analysis for alternative lag selection criteria.
27We neglect the global variables (Xt) for simplicity and we only use the domestic lags (p) since by construction are always
greater than the foreign variables lags (q).
9
Systemic Risk Spillovers Across the Euro Area March 2021
Multiplying both parts of equation (8) by Go−1, we obtain the autoregressive representation of the model:
Yi,t = b0 +
p∑
j=1
FjYt−j + ηi,t (9)
where b0 = Go−1a0, Fj = Go−1Gj and ηt = Go−1εt
The dynamic properties of the model are analyzed by using Generalized Impulse Response Functions (GIRFs),
introduced by Koop et al. (1996) and adapted to VAR framework in Pesaran & Shin (1998). We follow Smith & Galesi
(2017) SGIRF methodology, who identify structural shocks in a country by using the triangular approach by Sims
(1980). Country shocks (εi,t) are assumed to be uncorrelated with the shocks in the common variable equation (ut).
Alternative ordering of the variables should not affect the outcome as long as the contemporaneous correlations remain
unrestricted. For a more detailed description of the model, we refer to Smith & Galesi (2017) and Chudik & Pesaran
(2016).28
4 Systemic Risk Shocks
In this section we present the empirical findings about the impact of systemic risk spillovers across the Eurozone.29 We
employ monthly data for the period 2001 to 2018 to take advantage of the fact that all the countries had adopted the
common currency and they appertain to the ECB’s monetary authorities’ regulations.30 Initially, we analyse the response
of a country’s systemic risk following a euro area aggregate shock, in other words when all countries experience an
unexpected one standard error (s.e.) increase in the level of risk. In addition, we analyse the impact of systemic risk
shocks at a country and a euro-regional level. This is one of the first papers to look at cross-country spillovers, whereas
most of the existing literature analyzes the monetary union as a whole or it only focuses on the largest economies.
Finally, an important aspect of systemic risk is that it has (in theory) a negative effect on the real economy. Therefore,
we analyse this relationship by examining the impact of an unexpected increase in the euro area systemic risk on output
and also the role of spillovers in the transmission of the shock.
4.1 Euro Area Shocks
To investigate the degree of exposure of Eurozone economies to the rest of the union members, we present the SGIRFs
following a union-wide systemic risk shock. In Figure 3, the red line depicts the dynamic response of systemic risk
at the country level to an one standard error increase in the euro area’s risk level. The results indicate that there is an
unambiguous strong contagion amongst Eurozone economies. The transmission of the shock has immediate effect on
the union members’ financial systems and it fades out 10 periods after its occurrence.
28For the estimation of the model, we use the Matlab codes from the GVAR Toolbox by Vanessa Smith.
29For the identification of the systemic risk shock, we use the standard Cholesky decomposition. Dovern & van Roye (2014) adopt
a similar approach to identify FSI shocks in the GVAR framework.
30In the Appendix, Table A1 describes the data series and their sources.
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Figure 3: Euro Area Systemic Risk Shock: SGIRFs of Systemic risk
Notes: The figure reports the SGIRFs of systemic risk in the 11 examined euro area economies, following for a union-wide
systemic risk shock. The country level model includes 3 domestic variables; logGDP, logHICP and the log∆CoV aR index and
the shadow rate as a global variable to capture the monetary policy. The identification of the shock is based on the Cholesky
decomposition and the sampling period is 2001m1-2018m12. The red line is the standard responses of the domestic systemic
risk and the black line is the SGIRFs when we mute the spillover effect. The differences between the two indicate the impact of
the direct contagion effect amongst euro area economies. The lag selection is based on the Akaike information criterion (AIC).
The shaded area represents the 68% confidence level, which is based on 200 bootstrap iterations.
We then decompose the effect into the domestic and the spillover channel.31 The black line represents the systemic risk
responses following a euro area risk shock when we mute the vector of foreign variables. The difference between the
two lines depicts the effect of the spillover channel. The degree of interconnectedness is considerably higher in the
core countries, which are more exposed to systemic risk shocks at the union level. Moreover, a sizeable percentage of
the variation of the SGIRFs can be attributed to the spillover channel as being observed by the difference between the
responses with and without the foreign variables. The responses of the countries in the periphery are also significant but
31According to Allen et al. (2011), one of the important costs of financially integrated markets is that domestic economies are
exposed to foreign credit shocks.
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smaller in magnitude on average. The stronger impact amongst peripheral countries is being observed in Greece, which
was vulnerable probably due to the government debt crisis (see Grammatikos & Vermeulen, 2012). The responses in
this region are driven mostly by domestic factors, whereas the exposure to core economies and the spillover effect are
weak or insignificant.32 Therefore, our results support that the main transmission channel of systemic risk is running
from peripheral to core countries.33 Financial stress spillovers is one of the main disadvantages of the high degree of
financial integration in the monetary union, which in this case appears to be less beneficial for core economies.34
4.2 Euro-Regional and Country Shocks
The GVAR framework allows us to examine the systemic importance of individual countries. Table 1 illustrates the
peak systemic risk responses following regional and country specific shocks.35A shock in the two euro area regions has
similar effect for the euro area level of systemic risk. However, peripheral countries account only for one third of the
union’s GDP, based on our sample. This indicates that they are disproportionately systemically important in comparison
to core countries. In addition, in line with the previous findings, we observe that spillovers are stronger from periphery
to core economies (2.70) than from core to the periphery (0.66). If we focus at the country level, we observe that Italy
and Spain are the most systemically important countries in the euro area.36 The largest economy in the monetary union,
Germany, is also systemically important, especially across the core countries.37 We observe that core countries are
highly interconnected with a country level shock having a strong impact on the rest of the economies of the region but a
weak effect on peripheral economies. On the other hand, peripheral economies’ shocks affect both regions. It is worth
noticing that small economies appear to be also systemically important. Portugal and Ireland account only for 1.8% and
2.1% of Eurozone’s GDP38 respectively, but their contribution to aggregate systemic risk is significant. Finally, the
impact of systemic risk shocks originating in Greece is relatively low at the union level. Therefore the findings support
that Greece is more exposed to the union rather than the other way round.
Overall, the evidence suggests that peripheral countries are a significant source of systemic risk for the euro area. The
need for monitoring the spillovers from the periphery has been documented before in the literature. According to
Constancio (2012), contagion from the peripheral countries has contributed to union-wide financial stress, especially
after July 2011 and the sovereign debt crisis. He also highlighted the strong degree of stress transmission from Italy and
Spain to Greece, Portugal and Ireland’s government bonds. Similarly, Caporale & Girardi (2013) analyse the spillovers
32Although the transmission of systemic risk from core countries is weak, the empirical evidence in Table 1 suggest that there are
risk spillovers from the other peripheral economies.
33Gorea & Radev (2014) find evidence of an active contagion transmission channel from the euro area periphery towards its core.
34As depicted in Figure 3, the increase in systemic risk is more than double when we take into consideration the spillover effect in
countries as Germany and France.
35In the vast majority of the cases, the transmission of the systemic risk is immediate and the peak response is being observed in
the first period after the occurrence of the shock.
36To quantify the systemic importance of a country, we look at the increase of the euro area aggregate systemic risk index following
a country level shock as depicted in the first column of Table 1.
37Eller et al. (2017) apply a GVAR model to examine the international impact of a fiscal policy shock in Germany. Similarly to
our findings they found that mostly core economies affected by the positive cross-border spillovers. The effect is positive but weaker
for Periphery. They also recognize that the transmission of the shock is through the financial channel.
38The percentage is estimated based on the average quarterly GDP for the examined period 2001-2018.
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in terms of borrowing cost from fiscal imbalances in the euro area economies. They find that negative externalities from
Italy and other peripheral countries could lead to crowding out effects for the euro area consumption and an increase in
the government bond rates in all countries and regions.
Table 1: Country and Regional Systemic Risk Shocks
Systemic Risk SGIRFs (×10−2)
Regional Shocks Euro Area Core Periphery
Core 2.92** • 0.66**
Periphery 2.99** 2.70** •
Country Shocks Euro Area Core Periphery
GER 1.70** 3.04** -0.32**
FRA 1.57** 2.21** 0.34**
NDL 1.43** 1.76** 0.79**
BEL 1.40** 1.68** 0.87**
AUS 0.81** 1.00** 0.43**
FIN 0.27** 0.36** 0.09**
ITA 2.93** 2.60** 3.57**
ESP 1.99** 1.72** 2.50**
GRE 0.45** 0.44** 0.48**
POR 0.67** 0.65** 0.70**
IRE 0.67** 0.65** 0.70**
Notes: The table illustrates the peak (positive) regional SGIRF for systemic
risk following an one standard error increase in the systemic risk at regional
and country level. For the identification of the shock we apply the Cholesky
decomposition with the ordering being GDP, Prices and systemic risk. For
the vast majority of the cases, the impact of systemic risk is immediate and
the peak response is being observed in the first period after the shock occurs.
Notation of ** and * indicate statistically significant results at 90% and 68%
respectively.
4.3 Impact of systemic risk shocks on economic activity
The 2008 financial crisis highlighted how a systemic event, such as the collapse of Lehman Brothers, can substantially
affect real economic activity. Monitoring financial stress has become a major concern for regulators especially since the
Great Recession and the European sovereign debt crisis. The relationship between financial stress and business cycles
is widely-documented in the literature. Bloom (2009) uses a structural framework to analyse how uncertainty affects
economic activity. His result suggest that an uncertainty shock reduces investments and hiring and consequently leads
to a sharp recession. Dovern & van Roye (2014) employs a GVAR model with Financial Stress Indexes (FSI) to capture
the variation in financial markets. Their results indicate that US and global financial stress shocks have a lagged adverse
effect on economic activity worldwide. Van Roye (2014) focuses on the euro area and most specifically on Germany
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and finds that when the stress index exceeds a certain threshold level, an increase in financial stress has a significant
negative effect on economic activity.39
Figure 4: Euro Area Systemic Risk Shock: SGIRFs of GDP
Notes: The figure reports the responses of logGDP in the euro area regions and the 11 examined economies, following for a
union-wide systemic risk shock. The country level model includes 3 domestic variables; logGDP, logHICP and the log∆CoV aR
index and the shadow rate as a global variable to capture the monetary policy. The identification of the shock is based on the
Cholesky decomposition and the sampling period is 2001m1-2018m12. The red line is the standard responses of the domestic
systemic risk and the black line is the SGIRFs when we mute the spillover effect. The differences between the two indicate
the impact of the direct contagion effect amongst euro area economies. The lag selection is based on the Akaike information
criterion (AIC). The shaded area represents the 68% confidence level, which is based on 200 bootstrap iterations.
To examine the relationship between the stress in financial markets and economic activity, we analyse the responses of
output following an unexpected increase in the aggregate level of systemic risk in the Eurozone. In the first row of
Figure 4, we present the response of output for the euro area and the two euro-regions. Our empirical findings indicate
that increases in systemic risk result in a persistent slowdown in economic activity. At the country level, we observe low
39Similar evidence is provided by Holló et al. (2012) and Evgenidis & Tsagkanos (2017), who support that in periods of high
stress, the impact of a stress shock on industrial production is significantly stronger.
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variation across both regions and homogeneous responses. Greece and Ireland which both needed bailout programs to
stabilize their economies, suffer the most severe drop in GDP following a union-wide systemic risk shock. In addition,
we present the responses when there is no direct spillover effect amongst countries to examine the significance of
financial contagion on output responses.40 In the majority of the countries, the spillover effect plays an important role
and results in deeper recessions. It is worth noticing that in some core economies, namely the Netherlands, Belgium
and Austria, when we mute the foreign variables from the country equation, the impact of systemic risk shocks on
output is insignificant or even positive. On the other hand, Italy, Greece and Ireland present a more significant drop if
we don’t take into consideration the spillover effect, which indicates that domestic factors drive the responses. The
findings are in line with the previous empirical evidence which indicates that core economies are exposed to systemic
risk spillovers from the Periphery, whereas the latter is more affected by the domestic macro-financial environment.
The sizeable adverse effect on the economic activity highlights the need for close monitoring of systemic risk at the
country level but also the financial contagion across the union members.
In summary, we provide evidence of significant systemic risk transmission across the euro area economies. This
degree of financial contagion is a strong mechanism through which domestic shocks are propagated to other economies.
However, as noted by Allen et al. (2011), spillovers should not undermine the rationale of financial integration in the
euro area since the gains from diversification and risk sharing outweight potential costs. In addition, they support that
some of the costs arisen from the contagion effects can be attributed to the lack of policy coordination and they can be
avoided. In the next section, we examine how central banks can use different tools to mitigate systemic risk and also the
role of the spillovers in the effectiveness of monetary policy.
5 Monetary Policy and Systemic Risk
Central banks have a pivotal role in supervising and supporting financial stability. An extensive amount of literature has
focused on the linkage between monetary policy and financial stress, however in the period of the ZLB the empirical
evidence is mixed. In this section, we examine if this relationship is homogeneous across countries but also across time.
Borio & Zhu (2012) is one of the first papers to introduce the concept of the risk-taking channel by analysing the impact
of monetary policy on agents’ risk perception. They support that accommodative monetary policy encourages more
risk-taking behavior of financial institutions. Similar findings are presented by Neuenkirch & Nöckel (2018) who argue
that euro area expansionary monetary policy shocks lead to a decrease in the banks’ lending standards and consequently
to an increase in systemic risk. More recently, Faia & Karau (2019) find evidence of the risk-taking channel in the US,
whereas in the euro area there is evidence of the price puzzle and the systemic risk responses are insignificant.41
40See the black line with the dotted confidence interval in Figure 4.
41They apply a Panel VAR to analyse the effect of monetary policy shocks and they use both Wu & Xia (2016) and Krippner’s
(2013) shadow rate to capture unconventional policies.
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On the other hand, another strand of the literature argues that expansionary unconventional monetary policy supported
the financial system during the crisis (see Gambacorta et al., 2014 and Boeckx et al., 2017).42 Kapinos (2020) finds that
expansionary news shocks result in lower systemic risk during the zero lower bound period. In light of these results, we
proceed by dividing the sample period into two sub-periods with the cutting point being the month that the shadow rate
becomes negative.43 For the first sample period, our results below are in line with the risk-taking channel, therefore
a monetary expansion leads to greater systemic risk. However, when we focus on the period of the ZLB and of the
unconventional monetary policies, the relationship is being reversed and expansionary policy shocks lead to systemic
risk reduction.
5.1 Identification of Monetary Policy Shocks
5.1.1 Cholesky decomposition and shadow rate
To capture changes in the monetary policy stance, we use the shadow rate by Wu & Xia (2016), which is being
modeled as a common (global) variable.44 The domestic variables include the GDP, prices and systemic risk45 which
is estimated at a country level. Figure 5 illustrates the euro area aggregate responses following an unexpected one
standard error decrease in the shadow rate. When we focus on the first sub-period, we find evidence of a price puzzle
with an expansionary monetary policy shock to result in lower prices and in a drop in economic activity. In the second
sub-period, the price puzzle disappears and an expansionary monetary policy leads to inflationary pressure and a boost
in economic activity.
As far as the systemic risk is concerned, in the first period the evidence supports the risk-taking channel of monetary
policy. Interestingly, the relationship changes over time and becomes positive in the second period, when the adoption
of expansionary policies at the ZLB, led to a considerable reduction of the euro area systemic stress. According to our
findings, the response peaks five periods after the shock occurs. We also observe significant heterogeneity amongst the
countries’ responses in line with the literature on the Euro area monetary policy shocks (see Burriel & Galesi, 2018).
The impact is stronger for core countries that drive the response of the union-wide variables.46 On the other hand, the
responses of the peripheral countries are negative but insignificant, which indicates that the region has not benefited by
the UMPs in terms of financial stability.47 This could explain our previous findings that periphery is a considerable
source of risk for the rest of the union. In Section 5.3 we will discuss in detail the heterogeneity of regional responses
following a monetary policy shock.
42Gambacorta et al. (2014) and Boeckx et al. (2017) use the assets of the ECB balance sheet as an instrument of monetary policy
and they argue that these policies do not increase the volatility of the financial system (VIX) or systemic stress (CISS) respectively.
43The specific sub-samples are being selected so we can analyse the impact of the monetary policy before and after the period of
the Zero Lower Bound.
44IMF (2016) and Colabella (2019) also use shadow rates and Cholesky decomposition to identify monetary policy shocks in a
GVAR model.
45All the data series have been transformed using the logarithms.
46See Appendix, Figure A1 for the regional responses.
47The results are based on the Akaike lag selection criterion. For robustness purposes, we also include the responses based on
SBC. The main responses are presented in the sensitivity analysis Table A5.
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Figure 5: Monetary Policy Shocks: Shadow Rate
Notes: The figure reports the SGIRFs following an expansionary monetary policy shock. The monetary policy shock is
defined as one s.e. decrease in the shadow rate and the identification strategy is based on the Cholesky decomposition. The
response variables which are being presented are the euro area aggregate GDP, price level and systemic risk in rows one to
three respectively. The first row refers to the sub-period before 2009 and the other to the second sub-period until 2018. The lag
selection is based on the Akaike information criterion (AIC). The shaded area represents the 68% confidence level, which is
based on 200 bootstrap iterations.
5.1.2 High-Frequency Monetary Surprises
The presence of the price puzzle indicates that the identification of a monetary policy shock through the Cholesky
decomposition is problematic (see Sims, 1992). To address this issue we follow the new strand of the literature that uses
the central bank’s announcements to identify monetary policy shocks. For that purpose, we use data from Altavilla et al.
(2019) who construct a Euro Area event-study database of monetary surprises (EA-MPD) by measuring the asset price
changes following a policy announcement window. By looking at the press release window and the very short-end of
the yield curve, they identify the ‘target’ surprises following the work of Gurkaynak et al. (2004).
The estimation is based on a factor model where M is a matrix that includes changes in yields of risk-free rates at
different maturities48 and F stands for the latent factors which are being estimated by principal component analysis.
M j = F jΛj + ej (10)
where j = {press release or conference release}
48More specifically, they include the changes in 1, 3, and 6-month and 1, 2, 5, and 10-year yields. For maturities longer than 2
years, the German sovereign yields are being used as a proxy for the euro due to lack of data at this time period.
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The main advantage of this methodology is that it identifies more precisely monetary surprises by capturing new policy
tools, such as Forward Guidance and Quantitative Easing (QE).49 This is one of the first papers that incorporates
high-frequency shocks into the GVAR model.50 For that purpose, we follow Plagborg-Møller & Wolf (2019) who
show that the structural estimation of a proxy SVAR model could be carried out by using the monetary policy shock
series ordered first in a standard recursive VAR model. Therefore, we include the externally identified shock in the
model as an exogenous variable that has a contemporaneous effect on the macroeconomic variables and systemic risk.
Similar analysis has been carried by Miranda-Agrippino (2016) and Jarociński & Karadi (2020) who also incorporate
high-frequency surprises ordered first in a VAR model. Since all the variables in the model are also expressed in
levels and not in differences, in line with Coibion (2012), we use the cumulative shock series to identify the policy
shocks. Similarly to Barakchian & Crowe (2013), we let the series to take values equal to zero for months with no
announcements.51
Figure 6 presents the responses following an expansionary monetary policy shock for the two sub-periods we have split
the sample into. By incorporating the high-frequency shocks into the model the price puzzle disappears. For the first
period, an accommodative policy shock results to an increase in GDP and prices. In accordance with the results shown
above, the regional and country responses are not homogeneous. The impact is stronger in core countries, whereas the
peripheral economies present insignificant responses. The consequence of the monetary expansion is the increase in
systemic risk in both regions, which is line with the “risk-taking channel”.
Regarding the second period, the findings are similar to those obtained using the shadow rate shocks as shown in the
previous section. In both cases, output and price level increase following a monetary expansion, with only the results
for core economies being statistically significant. With respects to systemic risk, the empirical evidence provide novel
policy implications. A negative shock in the policy instrument decreases significantly following the shock. In terms of
regional responses, peripheral economies benefit less from the policy changes than core countries. The main difference
in the responses between the two different identifications of the monetary policy shock in the second sub-period, is
the timing of the responses. The high-frequency instrument analysis leads to an immediate decrease of systemic risk,
whereas in the case of the shadow rate shocks the lowest point was reached after 5 periods. However, this was expected
due to the construction of the ‘target’ surprises which affect asset prices only in the short term. The results are robust to
alternative measures of systemic risk such as the CISS (see Appendix, Figure A3).
49Goodhead (2021) uses the EA-MPD surprises in a Proxy SVAR to study the effect of forward guidance and yield curve
compression surprises on Euro Area macro-financial variables.
50In a similar context, Alzuabi et al. (2020) use monetary policy shocks series constructed based on the shocks series by Romer &
Romer (2004) for the US economy in the GVAR framework.
51They also use the cumulative shock series ordered both first and last and they present similar results for both specifications. As a
robustness check, we run the model with the shock series and the 3 month euro area government bond as the monetary policy tool
and we obtain similar results.
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Figure 6: Monetary Policy shock: High-Frequency Identification
Notes: The figure reports the SGIRFs of systemic risk following an expansionary monetary policy shock. The shock is defined
as one s.e. decrease in the exogenous cumulative target surprises series provided by Altavilla et al. (2019) and the identification
strategy is based on the Cholesky decomposition. The first three rows present the responses of the sub-period 2002-2008 and
the last three of the second sub-period until 2018. The responses include the aggregate euro area and two regions; core and
periphery and three variables are logGDP, logHICP and systemic risk. The lag selection is based on the Akaike information
criterion (AIC). The shaded area represents the 68% confidence level, which is based on 200 bootstrap iterations.
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5.2 Transmission channels of monetary policy
By employing a high-frequency identification strategy we can decompose the effect of (unconventional) monetary
policy into different transmission channels. For that reason, we use data from Altavilla et al. (2019) who extract the
surprises from the ECB’s press conference window. The first two factors are ‘timing’ and ‘forward guidance’, which
capture the signalling channel in the short run and medium run respectively. They also isolate the ‘QE surpises’ by
using the method of Swanson (2017) in the post-2014 period. Following their work, we incorporate one instrument at a
time52 to extrapolate each component separately and to examine how they impact systemic risk and the macroeconomic
environment. The process is identical to the ‘target’ surprises as the cumulative shock series are modelled as exogenous
variables in the GVAR model structure. In line with Altavilla et al. (2019), we focus on the period 2008m1-2018m8 for
the ‘timing’ and ‘forward guidance’ shocks and the period 2014m1-2018m8 for the ‘QE’ shock.
The results have interesting policy implications. The impact of the conference window shocks on systemic risk changes
over time. In the first part of the period there was only the expectations channel, but since 2014, QE dominates the press
conference window surprises. Our results indicate that the expectation channel has a positive relationship with systemic
risk for the entire period.53 In other words, expansionary monetary policy announcements lead to a systemic risk
reduction. The effect of the ‘timing’ shock, that refers to the short-term expectations, is stronger in the first periods and
it results to an increase in output and a decrease in systemic risk, but also causes inflationary pressures. The ‘forward
guidance’ factor presents similar results leading to a decline in systemic risk a year after the shock. However, the
results on output and price level are insignificant and in some cases negative in the short-run. It’s worth noticing though
that in both channels we observe considerable heterogeneity across regions. The euro area systemic risk response is
predominately driven by core economies, whereas peripheral countries experience in some cases higher systemic risk,
inflationary pressures and weak growth.54
On the period after 2014 and the initiation of QE, the results are significantly different. If we estimate the impact of the
target surprises and shadow rate shocks for the 2014m1-2018m12 period, we observe that the decrease in systemic risk
is considerably lower. The findings from the ‘QE’ shocks indicate the asset purchases program led to an increase in the
aggregate systemic risk. The last row in Figure 7 presents the responses following a ‘QE’ shock. In terms of output, the
shock results to a positive but statistically insignificant effect in most of the countries. Systemic risk is increasing across
the euro area with the highest responses observed in core economies providing evidence of the risk-taking channel
similarly to expansionary shocks in normal times. It is worth mentioning that at the same time period expansionary
forward guidance decreases systemic risk but the effect is partially cancelled out by the impact generated by the asset
purchases program.
52The results for the timing and the QE factor are similar if you include all the instruments in the same model, whereas the
responses of the Forward Guidance shocks change but they statistically insignificant for most of the cases.
53The results are similar for the sub-periods 2001m1-2007m12 and 2014m1-2018m8.
54See Appendix, Figure A2 for the regional responses and Section 5.3 for the analysis of the asymmetry of responses following a
monetary policy shock.
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Figure 7: Monetary Policy shocks: Transmission Channels
Notes: The figure reports the SGIRFs of systemic risk following a monetary policy shock defined as one s.e. decrease in the
exogenous cumulative timing, Forward Guidance and QE surprises series provided by Altavilla et al. (2019). The identification
strategy is based on the Cholesky decomposition. The examined period is 2008m1-2018m12 for the first two shock series and
2014m1-2018m8 for the latter. The lag selection is based on the Akaike information criterion (AIC) . The shaded area represents
the 68% confidence level, which is based on 200 bootstrap iterations.
Our findings indicate that the initiation of the QE program creates a trade-off for the ECB between economic growth
and financial stability. In 2016, Mario Draghi, the then president of the ECB, recognized this adverse effect and he
clarified that is not the goal of the ECB to ensure the profitability of any particular institutions. More specifically,
QE programs can reduce the profitability of financial institutions such as insurance companies which are exposed to
the decline in interest rates. In our sample insurance companies account for 26% of the firms’ Market Capitalization,
therefore we expect that the asset purchase program will result to a deterioration of the financial sector index.55
Part of the literature also emphasizes the negative impact of QE on financial stability. Gern et al. (2015) and Claeys
& Leandro (2016) support that prolonged expansionary monetary policies encourage risk-taking beyond the socially
desirable. Additionally, it may result in asset prices disconnecting from the fundamentals and fueling asset price bubbles,
which can trigger a banking crisis in the medium or long term. In conclusion, the different channels of unconventional
forms of monetary policy present mixed results regarding their impact on systemic risk. Despite the increase in systemic
risk caused by the adoption of the QE program, expansionary UMP shocks (signalling and target/policy rate surpises)
appear to be an important tool for mitigating systemic risk.56
55In Appendix, Table A2 presents the composition of the portfolio of financial firms that are being used for the systemic risk index.
56Similarly to Claeys & Darvas (2015) who support that the overall benefits of the UMP outweight the potential risks.
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5.3 Heterogeneity of Responses to Monetary Policy Shocks
The findings of the analysis so far suggest that the impact of monetary policy changes is not homogeneous amongst
regions and countries. As depicted in Figure 6, core euro area countries benefit the most from monetary policy changes
in terms of economic growth and financial stability. A negative shock results to a sizeable boost in economic activity
in core economies in both sub-periods. On the other hand, peripheral countries present positive but insignificant
responses. This is not the first paper that focuses on the monetary policy’s transmission asymmetries. Georgiadis
(2015) apply a GVAR model for the euro area to analyse the impact of monetary policy on output and inflation. He
finds significant heterogeneity amongst countries driven by structural characteristics such as the industry structure57
and more specifically the percentage of output associated with sectors sensitive to interest rate but also labor market
variables.58 In addition, Burriel & Galesi (2018), in a euro-area GVAR model, find union-wide significant asymmetries
in the transmission of monetary policy with countries with less fragile banking system to benefit the most.59 Other
characteristics such as the ease of doing business or the low level of GDP per capita result in higher output gains.
However the literature is limited regarding the potential asymmetries of ECB’s monetary policy on the financial
variables. Table 2 illustrates the peak systemic risk country responses following an expansionary monetary policy shock
to the shadow rate and the cumulative target surprises for both sub-periods. In the first period, the results are similar
across the euro area with both regions experiencing higher systemic risk after an unexpected decrease in the policy
rate. However, as discussed in the previous sections, the benefits in terms of economic growth of the expansion were
observed mostly in the core countries. Regarding the period after 2009, there is significant heterogeneity amongst
the Eurozone. Core countries such as France, Austria and Germany present a considerable decrease in systemic risk,
whereas peripheral economies such as Greece and Ireland experienced a small drop followed by a strong increase in
risk level. The empirical evidence underlines the asymmetric transmission of monetary policy across the monetary
union, not only in terms of output, but also with regards to financial stability. Similar pattern is being observed in the
conference window shocks, where timing and Forward Guidance result in mitigating systemic risk primarily in core
economies.60 Finally, QE shocks results in an increase in systemic risk in all the countries, with only core economies to
present statistically significant responses.61
Overall, the results support that monetary policy, especially in the period of the ZLB, affect primarily the Core
region. According to the aforementioned literature, the reasons that could explain the heterogeneity of responses is the
structure of the financial system and the domestic macroeconomic environment, since core economies were not affected
57Galesi & Rachedi (2019) construct a New-Keynesian model and they also attributed heterogeneity of responses on the industry
structure.
58Tillmann & Hafemann (2020) provide evidence of significant heterogeneity in the response of unemployment and stock market
across the Euro Area following an aggregate shock.
59Ciccarelli et al. (2013) suggest that the monetary transmission mechanism depends on the financial fragility of the sovereigns,
banks, firms and households. They also support that the effect of common monetary shock on GDP growth is heterogeneous across
countries and changes over time.
60Fendel et al. (2020) document that ECB communication affects the economies differently. Most specifically, economies with a
low solvency rating are affected across different maturities, whereas the impact for countries with a high solvency rating is significant
only in short term.
61See Appendix, Figure A2 for regional responses.
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Table 2: Monetary Policy Shocks: Regional and Country Responses
Systemic Risk SGIRFs (×10−2)
Period: Period A (2001-2008) Period B (2009-2018)
Instrument: HFI Shadow rate HFI Shadow rate
Regions
Euro Area 1.882** 2.158** -1.571** -0.672**
Core 2.027** 2.942** -1.772** -0.926**
Periphery 1.838** 0.702** -1.171** -1.949**
Countries
GER 2.004** 3.897** -1.653** -0.966**
FRA 2.107** 2.184** -2.310** -0.826**
NDL 2.510** 2.295** -1.281** -1.064**
BEL 2.312** 1.650** -1.595** -1.647**
AUS 1.958** 3.885** -2.084** -0.922**
FIN 0.593** 1.101** 1.660** -0.966**
ITA 2.275** 1.187** -1.321** -0.704**
ESP 1.827** 1.175** -1.595** -0.019**
GRE 1.251** 3.315** -0.582** -0.708**
POR 2.165** -2.096** -0.808** 0.414**
IRE 1.917** 1.306** 1.028** 1.604**
Notes: The table illustrates the peak systemic risk SGIRF responses following an expansionary monetary
policy shock for the two euro area regions; core and periphery. We divide the sampling period into
two sub-periods to examine the effect during conventional times and the zero lower bound. For the
identification of the shock we apply the Cholesky decomposition and as a policy instrument we use the
cumulative target surpises by Altavilla et al. (2019) and the shadow rate by Wu & Xia (2016). Notation
of ** and * indicate statistically significant results at 90% and 68% respectively.
considerably by the sovereign debt crisis. Moreover, regarding the QE shocks, based on the data provided by ECB on
the Public Sector Purchase Program (PSPP), 63.7% of the conducted purchases were focused on core economies and
the remaining 36.3% on peripheral countries, which could explain the weaker impact on the latter.
5.4 Direct and Indirect Effect of Monetary Policy
In the previous sections we showed that there are considerable financial spillovers across the monetary union. Contagion
and interconnectedness amongst financial institutions play an important role in the transmission of the monetary policy
(see Kabundi & De Simone, 2020). For that reason, we re-run the model when muting the systemic risk spillovers
across countries to decompose the effect of monetary policy into the direct and the indirect component.62 Overall, in
line with the literature, the impact of monetary policy is stronger in terms of the euro area GDP and inflation when we
take into consideration the spillover channel.63 With regards to systemic risk and the period before 2009, the contagion
62Similarly, Burriel & Galesi (2018) attribute a considerable fraction of the monetary shocks’ impact on the spillovers amongst
countries, which amplifies the aggregate effect.
63Detailed results available upon request.
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amongst euro area economies results in higher systemic risk as a consequence of the adoption of expansionary policies.
As presented in Figure 8, one standard error decrease in the cumulative target shock series leads to 1.8% increase in the
euro area systemic risk, but when we isolate the direct effect of the policy change, the impact is lower at 1.4%.
Figure 8: Monetary Policy shocks: Direct vs. Indirect Effect
Notes: The figure reports the SGIRFs of systemic risk following an expansionary monetary policy shock. The red line represents
the standard SGIRFs and the black line stands for the responses when we mute the spillover effect. The shock is defined as
one s.e. decrease in the exogenous cumulative target (first row), timing, Forward Guidance and QE (second row) surprises
series provided by Altavilla et al. (2019). The lag selection is based on the Akaike information criterion (AIC). The shaded area
represents the 68% confidence level, which is based on 200 bootstrap iterations.
In the second period, the results are mixed and on aggregate the initial systemic risk responses following a target
shock are slightly stronger when we include the spillover effect. However by focusing on the period after 2014, the
indirect channel reduces the effectiveness of the policy shocks and expansionary target shocks still decrease systemic
risk with the response to be significantly weaker in the presence of spillovers. To shed light on this result, we look
into the responses following the conference window shocks. The findings so far suggest that expansionary signalling
shocks (timing and forward guidance) reduce systemic risk. The results presented in Figure 8 allows us to examine
the direct and indirect effect of the conference windows shocks. The empirical evidence highlights the important role
that contagion plays on the transmission of the signalling shocks. In both cases of timing and forward guidance, if
we do not take into consideration the spillover effect the systemic risk responses become insignificant. The opposite
effect is being observed in the period after 2014, when spillovers enhance the effect of QE and result in higher systemic
risk. As we observe in the last figure, when the contagion effect is muted, the results become insignificant. Therefore,
cross-country spillovers play a crucial role for the transmission of monetary policy shocks. Regarding the policy rate
and QE surprises, financial contagion contributes significantly on the increase of systemic risk, whereas in the case of
the signalling channel, spillovers across economies are proved to be beneficial in terms of financial stability.
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5.5 Do policymakers react to systemic risk shocks?
The recent financial crisis created a trade-off for central banks between price and financial stability. Bekaert et al. (2013)
support that monetary policy may lead to risk aversion but policymakers also react to a nervous and uncertain market
place by loosening monetary policy. Gilchrist & Zakrajšek (2012) construct a new credit spread index (“GZ credit
spread”) derived by the decomposition of corporate credit spreads. They find that financial stress shocks result in a
decline in economic activity and monetary policy easing. In the euro area, Kremer (2016) finds that CISS is a key driver
of macroeconomic policies in Eurozone and that ECB reacted to changes in stress conditions.
Figure 9: ECB response to systemic risk shocks
Notes: The figure reports the shadow rate’s SGIRF following a euro area systemic risk shock during the period of negative
shadow rates (2009m1-2018m12). To capture the response of ECB, we employ different monetary policy instruments; the
shadow rates by Wu & Xia (2016) (both current and lag values), the cumulative target surprises and the (logarithm of the) assets
of the ECB’balance sheet. The results are similar across specifications. Both figures show that systemic risk shocks lead to an
monetary policy expansion. The lag selection is based on the Akaike information criterion (AIC). The shaded area represents the
68% confidence level, which is based on 200 bootstrap iterations.
The structure of the GVAR model allows the central bank to respond to changes in GDP, prices and also systemic risk.
Figure 9 illustrates the shadow rate’s response following a euro area systemic risk shock. Similarly to the previous
section, the analysis is focusing on the period 2008-2018. One standard error increase in the union aggregate systemic
risk results to a 0.13% decrease in the policy rate.64 In addition, we use alternative instruments of monetary policy such
as the log assets of ECB’s balance sheet, the lag of the shadow rate and the cumulative target surprises.65 The findings
are similar, with a systemic risk shock leading to a policy expansion. The empirical findings indicate that the ECB
reacted consistently to changes in systemic risk by using accommodative monetary policy to mitigate the risk level in
periods of higher volatility.
64For the analysis we use the shadow rates, so a decrease in the rate could be an actual decrease in the policy rate or asset
purchasing programs (QE).
65In this case the high-frequency target surprises are included as an endogenous variable in the model.
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6 Conclusions
Since the financial crisis, systemic risk has become a major concern for regulators and policymakers. According to the
ECB report (2009), the analysis of systemic risk should consider both endogenous and exogenous sources of risk. In
this paper we quantify the financial exposure of euro area economies to other union members. To capture financial
stress, we present a new index of country-level systemic risk based on micro-data and the ∆CoV aR methodology by
Adrian & Brunnermeier (2016). We then incorporate the index into a GVAR model to examine the spillovers across
euro area economies. The empirical evidence suggests that there are considerable systemic risk spillovers across the
union and that they play an important role in the transmission of monetary policy. The results are robust to alternative
measures of systemic risk. More specifically, we observe high degree of financial contagion amongst core countries,
which is not spreading out to the Periphery. On the other hand, our findings suggest that peripheral countries have a
disproportionate importance in spreading systemic risk. A systemic risk shock originated in the region affect all the
union members. By focusing at the country level, systemic risk shocks in small economies, such as Ireland and Portugal
have a sizeable effect on the other member countries, which highlights the need for monitoring financial risk not only at
the aggregate level. Additionally, we study the impact of systemic risk on economic activity. Our findings suggest that a
euro area systemic risk shock results in a significant drop in GDP across the union and that the responses are mostly
driven by the spillover channel. Greece and Ireland, which have both received financial rescue packages, appear to be
the more exposed economies.
Furthermore, we investigate the relationship between monetary policy and systemic risk by incorporating high-frequency
monetary policy surprises into the GVAR framework. In line with the literature, we find that in normal times a monetary
contraction reduces systemic risk. However, if we focus on the period of the ZLB when the unconventional forms
of policy were introduced, the relationship is reversed and expansionary monetary shocks lead to a decrease in the
risk level. We then decompose the monetary policy shocks into the signalling and the QE components to analyse the
transmission channels. Based on our results the QE program provides evidence of the risk-taking channel similarly
to expansionary shocks in normal times. Therefore, the reversed relationship between systemic risk and monetary
policy at the ZLB is predominately caused by the signalling channel; expansionary announcements lead to systemic
risk reduction. Finally, monetary policy shocks affect primarily the core economies and a significant proportion of the
response can be attributed to the spillover channel.
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Appendix
Figure A1: Shadow Rate Monetary Policy Shocks: Regional Responses
Notes: The figure reports the SGIRF following an expansionary monetary policy shock. We present the results for two regions;
core and periphery and two sub-periods; 2001-2008 and 2009-2018. The monetary policy shock is defined as one s.e. decrease in
the shadow rate by Wu & Xia (2016) and the identification strategy is based on Cholesky decomposition. The response variables
which are being presented are the euro area aggregate GDP, price level and systemic risk in columns one to three respectively.
The lag selection is based on the Akaike information criterion (AIC). The shaded area represents the 68% confidence level,
which is based on 200 bootstrap iterations.
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Figure A2: Conference Window Shocks: Regional Responses
Notes: The figure reports the SGIRFs of systemic risk following an expansionary monetary policy shock for the two euro area
regions; core and periphery. The shock is defined as one s.e. decrease in the cumulative timing, Forward Guidance and QE
surprises series provided by Altavilla et al. (2019) and the identification strategy is based on the Cholesky decomposition. The
examined period is 2008m1-2018m12 for the first two shock series and 2014m1-2018m8 for the latter. The lag selection is
based on the Akaike information criterion (AIC). The shaded area represents the 68% confidence level, which is based on 200
bootstrap iterations.
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Figure A3: Monetary Policy shock: Alternative Systemic Risk Measure (CISS)
Notes: The figure reports the SGIRFs of CISS following an expansionary monetary policy shock. The shock is defined as one s.e.
decrease in the exogenous cumulative target surprises series provided by Altavilla et al. (2019) and the identification strategy is
based on the Cholesky decomposition. The first three rows present the responses of the sub-period 2002-2008 and the last three
of the second sub-period until 2018. The responses include the aggregate euro area and two regions; core and periphery and
three variables are logGDP, logHICP and systemic risk. The lag selection is based on the Akaike information criterion (AIC).
The shaded area represents the 68% confidence level, which is based on 200 bootstrap iterations.
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Table A1: Data Description
Variable series Frequency Source
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Quarterly Eurostat
Industrial Production Monthly FED of St. Louis (FRED)
Harmonised Consumer Price Index (HCIP) Monthly Eurostat
Shadow Rate Monthly Wu & Xia (2016)
High-Frequency Monetary Surprises Monthly Altavilla et al. (2019)
ECB Assets Monthly Eurostat
Composite Systemic Stress Index (CISS) Monthly Eurostat
∆CoVaR and MES data Monthly Datastream
State Variables
3 month Goverment Bond Monthly FRED, Datastream, IMF
10 year Goverment Bond Monthly FRED
EURIBOR Monthly FRED
Stock Market Index Monthly Datastream
Notes: The table illustrates the sources of the economic and financial series used in the GVAR model estimation. We also report the
state variables sources used for the systemic risk index estimation. For countries where the 3 month govermnent bond is not available,
we use alternatively the Datastream series: TR EURO GVT 3MO.
Table A2: ∆CoVaR Estimation: Data
Financial Sectors
no. MV(%) no. MV(%)
Banks 55 44.65% Financial Services 81 13.52%
Insurance 25 26.05% Real Estate 100 15.79%
Countries
Core no. MV(%) Periphery no. MV(%)
GER 49 22.21% ITA 29 12.62%
FRA 48 22.86% ESP 25 14.33%
NDL 31 11.00% GRE 13 0.58%
BEL 32 6.62% POR 7 0.32%
AUS 13 3.28% IRE 9 1.64%
FIN 5 4.62% Total 261 1
Notes: The table reports the data used to estimate the ∆CoVaR index. For that purpose, we collect Price
and Market Capitalization data from Datastream for 261 active Euro Area financial firms. Data for ‘dead’
companies are not available, leading potentially to a survivorship bias. The sectoral division is based on
Datastream reports. We observe that banks account for almost 45% of the Market Capitalization of the Euro
Area financial system. We include firms that consists the (country) DS Financial sector as presented by the
data source. The estimation period is 2001m1-2018m12.
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Table A3: GVAR weights
GER FRA ITA ESP NDL BEL AUS FIN GRE POR IRE
GER 0.36 0.35 0.32 0.31 0. 30 0.30 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29
FRA 0.30 0.26 0.24 0. 23 0. 22 0. 22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22
ITA 0.24 0.22 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17
ESP 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11
NDL 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07
BEL 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
AUS 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
FIN 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
GRE 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.2 0.02 0.02
POR 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.2 0.02 0.02
IRE 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.2 0.02 0.02
Notes: The table illustrates the weights for the GVAR model.
The estimation is based on the average quarterly GDP data provided by Eurostat for the period 2001-2018.
Table A4: Lag order selection
Full Period Period A Period B Foreign var.
GER 3 3 3 1
FRA 2 1 2 1
ITA 3 2 2 1
ESP 4 4 2 1
NDL 4 4 2 1
BEL 4 4 3 1
AUS 1 1 1 1
FIN 2 4 1 1
GRE 4 4 3 1
POR 3 3 2 1
IRE 2 2 1 1
Notes: The table reports the optimal lag selection for the GVAR model
based on the Akaike information criterion (AIC) for the full time period
(first column) and two sub-periods (second and third column). The last
column stands for the lag of the foreign variables, which is set to be
equal to 1 by construction in line with the GVAR literature.
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Table A5: Sensitivity Analysis Results: Systemic Risk SGIRFs
Regions: Euro Area Core Periphery
Benchmark Model (∆CoV aR)
Core SR Shock 2.92** • 0.66**
Periphery SR Shock 2.99** 2.70** •
CMP Shock 1.88** 2.03** 1.84**
UMP Shock -1.57** -1.77** -1.17**
Alternative Measures of Systemic Risk
CISS
Core SR Shock 7.75** • 4.28**
Periphery SR Shock 8.18** 7.31** •
CMP Shock 16.20** 17.71** 13.55**
UMP Shock -3.52** -4.28** -2.39**
Alternative Lag Selection Method (SBC)
Core SR Shock 6.07** • 4.48**
Periphery SR Shock 6.41** 6.41** •
CMP Shock 1.54** 1.50** 1.61**
UMP Shock -1.40** -1.52** -1.16**
Alternative Weights: Trade (based on data from Burriel & Galesi, 2018)
Core SR Shock 3.68** • 1.07**
Periphery SR Shock 2.00** 3.21** •
CMP Shock* 1.58** 1.50** 1.72**
UMP Shock* -1.58** -1.72** -1.25**
Notes: The table illustrates the peak regional SGIRF for systemic risk following one s.e. increase in the systemic
risk at regional level and an expansionary monetary policy shock for both sub-periods. For robustness purposes,
we employ two different measures of systemic risk; ∆CoV aR and CISS. Across all specifications, periphery is
more systemically important than core economies. Regarding the monetary policy shocks, all the robust checks
are in line with the heterogeneous effects across periods of the benchmark model. Notation of ** and * indicate
statistically significant results at 90% and 68% respectively.
* To secure structural stability in same cases, we select the optimal lags based on the SBC.
** All the values are expressed in ×10−2
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